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PORTUGAL, 1974:
FALL OF THE COLONIAL DICTATORSHIP

1. Taking over of power

By the turn of 1973-74, the policy of the government in Portugal came to a deadlock, mainly because of the hopeless colonial wars.¹ Although the more and more frequent actions of mass demonstrations and resistance movements did not shake the state apparatus, they did increase its inner tension, thus advancing the crystallization of a power change that developed from within the repressive organization itself, the colonial army.

During the war, especially from 1968, the social composition and stratification characteristic of the body of officers changed (it consisted increasingly of modern middle-class citizens, thus a new military intellectual-class took shape), its ideological and later its political foundations were shaken: they realized the hopelessness of victory. The lack of a government policy promising military victory, and a decrease in the professional level and prestige of the army were joined by a threatening prospect of an unjust calling to account. The inflexibility of the government - renewing the tradition of *pronunciamento* - developed the idea of the necessity of an interference in politics.

A representative of one of the political trends of the army, general António de Spínola, the "unlikeliest liberal", became the vice-chief of general staff and the deputy-chief of Costa Gomes after a long colonial service, in January, 1974. In the spring of 1972, as a Guinean commander-in-chief, he had summed up his position

1 This essay forms part of dissertation of a candidacy (Debrecen, 1985) titled *Social-political fights in Portugal, 1961-1976 (A study of case of the allied bloc of power)*. Regarding antecedents see the following works of the author: *Years of Salazar-dictatorship (1926-1961)*; *Portugal, 1968: Stabilization or development? (Historical addition to quandary of reform)*; *Antifascist resistance and the colonial question in Portugal (1961-1974)*. These works were published in the following periodicals: *Századok* (Budapest) 1987/6 (pp. 1061-1100); *Világtörténet* (Budapest) 1986/3-4 (pp. 120-144); *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József Nominata. Sectio Scientiae Socialismi* (Szeged) T. XXII. 1987 (pp. 177-209).

in the statement: "This war can not be won in Guinea, but can be lost in Lisbon".² His conception, which he outlined in his book titled *Portugal And Its Future* (February, 1974), promised federation to the liberation movements in return for finishing the war, and thus his policy differed from that of the prime minister, Marcelo Caetano (although he agreed with the bridging of the "African" and the "European" interest groups of the ruling classes of the motherland).

In Spinola-ism, the fighting army itself turned against the war. This "liberalized" colonialism had a chance of success only by relying on an untouched bureaucracy and repressive organization, namely: the "strong democracy" of a conservative presidential regime.

After President of the Republic Spínola's aspirations had failed at the 1972 elections, and after he had tried in vain to put pressure on the political leadership in the spirit of the following slogan: "The army is not the pretorian guard of power", he was dismissed together with his supporters (in March, 1974). It became clear that he could not change the politics of the government in a legal way. Nevertheless there was an urgent need for change, so as to prevent the forming orthodox Salazarist turn and a possible explosion coming from the lower ranks. It also became clear that - as military-political factions of privileged groups were paralysing one another - the "generals" could only achieve the subversion of the government with the help of an illegal movement of the "captains" (middle-ranks officers who were in the centre of military charges such as Vasco Gonçalves, Melo Antunes and Saraiva de Carvalho).

A political organization, the CAPTAINS' MOVEMENT, had been developing in the army since the autumn of 1973. Its purpose was the establishment of a democratic regime for a peaceful settlement of the colonial question (in the spirit of the admission of the peoples' principle of self-determination) and the retrieving of lost military prestige. According to their starting-point: "it was impossible to achieve

2 Rodrigues, A. - Borgia, C. - Cardoso, M.: *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril - 229 dias para derrubar o fascismo*. Lisboa: Moraes, 1974. p. 245.

aims forced on them by a power that denies the fact that it lacks the suitable means of implementing its politics."³

This new movement was crystallized by March, 1974 as The ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (Movimento das Forças Armadas - MFA). The movement wanted to subvert the power, out as they were shattered by the dismissals in March, they were forced to search for allies, which they finally found: the Spinola-ists. Spinola could guarantee the alliance or neutrality of the society and the army, especially the apolitical majority of the colonial body of officers; the external and internal capitalist groups (first of all the greatest Champalimaud-group supporting him directly); the Great Powers and the international organizations involved (NATO above all); and the Catholic Church.

According to the "PROGRAM OF THE MFA", the compromised platform of the above trends,⁴ even "after thirteen years of fighting overseas, the existing political system has not succeeded in defining a concrete and objective overseas policy that leads to peace among Portuguese of all races and beliefs". Therefore, settling a peace strategy opposed to the government which lost its legitimacy "was possible only after the purging of the present internal policies and its institutions, and transforming them to be real representatives of the Portuguese people in a democratic way".

The program set forth that "the solution for the overseas war must be a political and not a military one", that an open and national debate was needed about the colonial question, and that an "overseas policy leading to peace" should be established therein.⁵ A Spinola-ist inspired passage, that the present power "must acknowledge its international obligations arising from contracts in force", purposed to calm the international environment.⁶

3 Orlando Neves (org. e introd.): *Textos históricos da Revolução*. Vol. I. Lisboa: Diabril, 1975. p. 16.

4 Ibid. p. 41.

5 Ibid. p. 45.

6 Ibid.

Behind the alliance of the "liberalising" conservative Spinola-ists and the revolutionary-democrat "Captains", stood the compromise of the modern finance-oligarchy, the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, which covered the domestically oriented (middle-) bourgeoisie, and the working class, also. The external economic and political groups, attached to the alliance by the monopol groups, accepted the fall of the Salazarist regime, but needed a two to three year transition period in the colonies and Portuguese protection so as to preserve their positions. This could be guaranteed by Spinola's conservative presidential regime.

The organizers and precise executors of the taking over of power, prepared in the above way, were the "captains": the Political Coordinating Committee (CCP) ruled by colonel Vasco Gonçalves and the military centre directed by major Saraiva de Carvalho. The military action starting at the dawn of 25th April subverted the authoritarian dictatorship of Caetano within the same day.

31% of the "captains", 14% of the headquarters of the Portuguese military units, and hardly 5% of the whole army participated actively in the action, and this fact shows the frailty of the victory and thus the significance of the preliminary alliance. Half of the military forces was "politically amorphous", while the 45% who were damaged in their interests were neutralized at the moment.⁷

The "palace revolution" appearance of the taking over of power, its bloodlessness and rapidity, was thus the condition of victory. However, it became the source of later problems: the smashing of the repressive organization and the shattering of the bureaucracy did not happen; it created the illusion of a national unity delaying the clarification of fronts; the purge of the new power did not happen; and it did not help to overcome the weakness of the democratic resistance movement, either.

According to the earlier compromise, with the participation of Spinola and six of his fellow generals, a new summit organization was founded: the JUNTA OF NATIONAL SALVATION (Junta de Salvação Nacional - JSN).

⁷ Diniz de Almeida, E.: *Ascensão, apogeu e queda do MFA*. Vol I. Lisboa: Sociais, 1978. p. 15.

During the political "wildcat scheme craze", after the taking over of power, and until the government came into office 54, and by July some 80. organizations were established which can be regarded as parties. The well-organized powers of the opposition, having cadres, a program and experience, came to light at once with great force. The mass movement, which started in earlier months and was peaking now, corresponded in several points to the trends of the PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCP), the PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS), the INTERSINDICAL oppositional trade union centre, the parties of the extreme left and the "captains". Their mutual pressure made the program, and especially the Spinola-ist conception, antiquated even in the first days (a purge by the lower ranks, de facto activity of parties, de jure acknowledgement of trade unions, dismissal of the Corporative Chamber, amnesty for deserters, dismissal of the legislature of Mozambique and Guinea etc.).

Limitation of the change to a conservative presidential system had already been frustrated by this time: besides the stepping up of the army, the euphoric atmosphere also blocked the repressive organization, paralyzed the central and local bureaucracy, and the made the right-wing (which had lost its political support because of the utter powerlessness of the Salazarist state) withdraw. This **Aliança Povo-MFA** ('people-MFA alliance'), the de facto alliance between the "captains" and the civil left-wing, created the possibility of the development of a revolutionary process. From this stage, the relationship between the monopol power and democratic human rights became a direct problem of the change from dictatorship to democracy.

In spite of a lack of organization, Caetano's earlier "young liberalists" appeared as a significant force. The group of the **POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PPD)**, forming now with the leadership of Sá Carneiro, was the inheritor of the "liberal wing" of the National Assembly elected in 1969.

After three weeks, the constitutional law No. 3/74 of 14th May outlined the provisional political system of Portugal. Consequently,⁸ for the planned one year

8 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 56-66.

before the election of a Constituent National Assembly, a power took shape which was highly separated in its institutions.

Spínola, who came to office as provisional President of the Republic on 15th May, was the president of JSN and the Council of State and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He elected or dismissed the government (which was responsible only towards him), he took care of constitutionalism and announced laws and orders. Regarding constitutional law, he was only responsible "towards the nation" and could effectively be limited by the JSN. The position became the centre of power of Spínola-ists. The right of appointment of military leaders was given to the authority of the JSN, thus the armed forces were made independent from the government (that is, from the civil power). In this, Chief of General Staff Costa Gomes was equal with the Prime Minister.

In the civil provisional government, which came into office on May 16th and had limited authority, the MFA forced a wide alliance which earlier could not have been established by the powers of the opposition. The consensus referred to the Constituent National Assembly. "Free elections to the Constituent National Assembly will be enormously significant - as the first proclamation of the communist party stated after the turn - and this will open the process of the democratic change of the Portuguese society. This purpose must not be distorted on any pretext."⁹ Two labour parties also participated in the liberalist and social-democratic dominated government (Mário Soares socialist party leader became Foreign Secretary and Álvaro Cunhal communist party leader became a minister without portfolio).

The consultative and constituent COUNCIL OF STATE, which had crystallized by the end of May, became the only institution of power in which the anonymous "captains" were represented - therefore it became the main field of political battles. Besides the seven members each of CCP and JSN (the two de facto centres of power), seven more members were appointed by Spínola, so that a conservative-liberal hegemony prevailed in the Council of State.

⁹ Documentos do CC do PCP (Abril - Dezembro de 1974). Lisboa: Avante, 1975. pp. 18-19.

However the "captains" possessed a considerable real power: they disposed directly of the dominant military units, tried to control every important institution of power, they could count on the support of the left-wing, as well as the labour of large-scale industry, the modern middle-class citizens, the soldiers, and the southern agricultural proletariat (which meant an active mass base). Though the revolution was definitely that of the capital at its beginning, as the country masses did not move in the first few months.

The pillar of the institutional power was set up by military groups represented by Spínola, monopolies represented by economic co-ordinating minister Vieira de Almeida and the block of centrist powers (and the right-wing behind them) led by Sá Carneiro. Its content was determined by the alliance of the ruling class and popular classes with the dominance of the former one.

This formula of power had limited the purpose of the big bourgeoisie in advance, opening a way towards a quicker and wider capitalist modernization (by relieving the country of the dead weight of the colonial war and the corporate mechanism). The proceeding wage-demands questioned the competitiveness based on a cheap labour force. The democratic claims jeopardized the political power of capital, the decolonizational trends imperiled its economic position in Africa. The big-bourgeoisie could rely neither on a repressive organization, nor on a party policy structure.

2. Failure of the "liberalized" colonialism

The solution of the problem initially followed a line in compliance with the constitution of power, in the spirit of Spínola-ism which purposed to restore the "climate of institutionalized legitimacy".

The time-table for settling the colonial question was the following¹⁰ (with the exception of Macau and Timor):

1. armistice, in return for which Portugal promised to acknowledge the principle of self-determination;

10 Ruas, H. B. (coord.): *A Revolução das Flores*. Vol. I. Lisboa: Aster, 1974. pp. 294, 305-6.

2. the quickened development of colonies, the establishment of democratic institutions;
3. a plebiscite with alternatives of federation, confederation or independence;
4. "independence" within the scope of a federation.

However Spínola's conception, as outlined in his book in February, immediately encountered the resistance of the liberation movements, for whom April 25th opened an unexpected prospect of quick independence. Their relation to the Spínola-ist time-table was therefore well defined: "we are concerned in the changing of Portugal's regime to the extent to which the new government acknowledges our people's right to a complete independence" - declared the MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT (FRELIMO), for example.¹¹ So Portugal was compelled to contact fighting movements, and by the middle of June, the viewpoints of the negotiating parties became rigid: while Portugal acknowledged the principle of self-determination (which not involved independence) only on the stipulation of previous armistice; the liberation movements made armistice (regarded as merely a practical question) depend on the previous acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination (in the sense of independence) of the colony ruled exclusively by them.

Portugal then decided to force the armistice on the liberation movements by military means. Recruits were called in, more than ever, and yet, the liberation movements had greater successes than ever before: the AFRICAN PARTY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE (PAIGC) went on besieging surrounded towns, the FRELIMO started surrounding towns in Central Mozambique and the divided PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) was also able to gain victories.

By continuing the war Portugal encountered insurmountable difficulties: even the colonial troops themselves were against it. After negotiations had been broken off between Portugal and FRELIMO in Lusaka, the Portuguese officers in Mozambique demanded an end to the war in a meeting, then the "captains" directly

11 O processo revolucionário de guerra popular de libertação. Collecção textos e documentos da FRELIMO. Maputo: *Departamento do Trabalho da FRELIMO*, 1977. p. 197.

contacted the FRELIMO. In Bissau, more than a thousand officers and soldiers of the colonial army "set up a claim for the Portuguese government's acknowledgement of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the right of the people of Cape Verde Islands to self-determination and independence, the only political step which would lead to a real peace."¹² Then the "captains" also directly contacted the PAIGC.

Similar temptations took shape concerning other questions as well (pay-raises and strikes, a purge of the state apparatus, the mass media and the army, as well as an assertion of military hierarchy against "captains" etc.). Thus a stalemate developed by the beginning of July: the formal decision was in the hands of the Spinola-ists, however, the means of execution was held by the "captains" and their allies, so the talks between the two parties were interrupted when the colonial question became rigid in June. They could not go further according to the original compromise unless the power relations could be changed, but this required settling the matter of quandary: whether to acknowledge the independence or to continue the war.

Spinola-ists, who now were compelled to take steps, started with the ultimatum of Prime Minister Palma Carlos. According to the proposal¹³ of the beginning of July, which formally proposed to modify the No. 3/74 law, the President of the Republic would be elected within three months, and at the same time a provisional constitution would be accepted, the elections to the Constituent National Assembly would be delayed till November, 1976, and the authority of the government would be increased for the sake of disposing power. The ultimatum can be regarded as an attempted constitutional putsch with the goal of establishing a conservative Spinola-ist presidential regime, as:

1. at the presidential elections, Spinola - with his probable victory - could have gained a legitimacy independent from the movements of the "captains";

12 Porch, D.: *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*. London: Croom Helm, 1977. p. 114.

13 Rodrigues, A. - Borgia, C. - Cardoso, M.: *Portugal depois de Abril*. Lisboa: Intervoz, 1976. p. 40.; Kuntz, J.: *Les fusils et les urnes: le Portugal aujourd'hui*. Paris: Denoel, 1975. p. 27.

2. with the delay of the elections to the Constituent National Assembly, right-wing parties could have gained more time for consolidation;
3. and the "captains" position would have been shattered by subordinating military forces to the government.

The proposal was dismissed by organs of power for different reasons, and in return the prime minister and his supporters abdicated. During the cabinet crisis, the subject of the debate on the surface was the person of the new prime minister, and the decision was enforced by military troops of the capital, directed by the "captains". The formal novelty of the second provisional government, coming to office on 17th July with the leadership of Vasco Gonçalves, was that the "captains" undertook a direct political role; the government essentially became social-democrat dominated at the expense of the Spino-la-ists.

As an other important step, the "captains" military centre was legalized as OPERATION COMMAND FOR THE CONTINENT (COPCON), setting the maintenance of public order "in the spirit of 25th April" as a task, with a covert hint of being against police and gendarme forces. Its leader, Sarajva de Carvalho, became commander of the military district of Lisbon at the same time, so that the "captains" formal influence in military forces and political life suddenly increased.

With the solution of the crisis of July, the balance of power changed within the initial alliance: the Spino-la-ists lost ground. These the two opposed centres of power now became the President of the Republic (JSN) and the government (CCP). The position of Costa Gomes, who balanced and negotiated between them, was upgraded.

The constitutional law, No. 7/74 of July 26th, which "better defined" the original program, was a decisive consequence of the changed balance of power and the most important political step in 20th century Portugal. "The principal, which considers the solution of overseas wars politically and not militarily, called forth Portugal's acknowledgement of the principle of people's self-determination", that the law expressed. On the other hand it undertook the main demand of, the liberation movements: "Acknowledging the principle of self-determination, with all

of its consequences, including the acceptance of the independence of overseas territories."¹⁴

After the crisis of July, the emphasis within the finance-oligarchy was placed, by the supporters of federation, on those who agreed with some form of "neocolonist" solution. With the decolonizational law, Spínola's function, in which he transgressed the limits of his original position, was the assurance of this solution. It stipulated the driving back of popular forces, especially the "captains" movement, in the motherland, and the liberation movements in the colonies. The organization of a "Spinola-ist bloc" of conservative-reactionary forces and a kind of "third power" in the colonies began accordingly.

The moderate conservatives made a successful attempt at this in the long run: as a member of the European Christian-democratic Union, the CENTRE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (CDS) evolved from Caetano's technocrats and from groups of bourgeoisie, becoming conservative now, under the leadership of Freitas do Amaral, in July. This party fundamentally represented a continuity of marcelism, under the changed circumstances.

Problems of the forming "Spinola-ist bloc" were however of great significance:

1. clergy (who were influential even after April 25th) and monarchists could not be won over;
2. internal conflicts within the ultras and the aloofness of moderate CDS indicated that they were divided;
3. the radical fuglemen were the compromised elements of the old regime;
4. Spinola as "supraparty representative of the nation" did not wish his person and position to enter into the service of political purposes (though he would have been glad to be a "silent partner" in a succesful political power again). The inherited state apparatus, lead now by Spinola, remained the hope of the bourgeoisie.

After the decolonization law, it still remained an open question, who should practice self-determination in the name of "peoples of the colonies" and how. Spinola had to centralize decolonization in his own hands so as to drive back liberation movements for the benefit of a "third power" and in order to enforce

14 Ruas, H. B. (coord.): *A Revolução das Flores* Vol. III. Lisboa: Aster, 1974. p. 67.

the referendum. "It is the task of the President of the Republic to sign agreements concerning the practice of rights acknowledged in previous clauses after hearing out the JSN, the Council of State and the provisional government", he inserted in the law after a one-week delay.¹⁵

In Guinea, which was considered a touchstone (where armed struggle had been decided long ago in favour of the PAIGC), Portugal, according to the agreement¹⁶ signed on August 26th, acknowledged Guinea-Bissau as an independent state and the right to independence of the peoples of Cape Verde Islands on September 10th, 1974.

There was no need for a "third power" in Angola: antagonism among three rival movements became the main obstacle to quick decolonization. After the inner turn of MPLA could not be enforced, Spínola decided to take a step which was extreme even from the standpoint of his own program: he signed a secret agreement with President of Zaire Mobutu, on September 14th. In compliance¹⁷ with it, Spínola supported the NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF ANGOLA (FNLA) against the MPLA, he surrendered Cabinda to a small separatist movement supported by Zaire, and he supported the establishment of a "federal republic" including Zaire, Angola and Cabinda under the presidency of Mobutu and the vice-presidency of Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA. In return, Mobutu guaranteed a twenty year exclusive right of Portuguese monopolies to exploit resources of the "federal republic", gained support in Africa for Spínola's "decolonizational" plan and helped win Guinea and Mozambique back in every way.

With significant concessions, the agreement attracted Portuguese bourgeoisie with huge economic potential. For its execution, however, there was a need to militarily drive-back the MPLA, but the colonial army was not willing to fight

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 205-206.

¹⁷ Diniz de Almeida op. cit. p. 158.; Porch op. cit. pp. 116-117.

here, either. A meeting of five hundred Portuguese officers in Angola, on September 18th, brought a decision to end the war.¹⁸

Mozambique directly endangered the Spinoal-ist plan: as a viable "third power" could not be joined together, an agreement of independence was signed in Lusaka, on September 7th. Accordingly,¹⁹ until the date of independence, June 25th, 1975, in the intermediate period Portugal and FRELIMO together guaranteed the process of the taking over of power.

At the moment of signing the agreement, a revolt of settlers broke out in Lourenço Marques and spread over to Beira as well. Rebels rejected the agreement of Lusaka, which had been signed without them, and they tried to negotiate with Portugal on the basis of a referendum. However, under the pressure from the "captains", the government of Portugal described the revolt as high-treason and the colonial army was mobilized against it. As a reaction, white settler ultras unilaterally announced the independence of Mozambique (which they had been planning since 1972). Although their hopes (support of Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia as well as the change-over of Portuguese troops) did not materialize, and the rebellion was suppressed.

The basis for the open political appearance of Spinoal-ist forces was given by Spinoal himself in his speech at acknowledging Guinea-Bissau on September 10th. "Decolonization", he interpreted the basic task again, "opposed to certain people's naive ideas, should not consist in a mere transfer of power to the party organization that sustained the armed struggle against the former Portuguese regime".²⁰ For the sake of the "authentic democracy", he appealed to the "silent majority": "the silent majority of the Portuguese nation must wake up at last to defend itself against extremist totalitarians".²¹

18 Diniz de Almeida op. cit. pp. 156-157.

19 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 207-212.

20 Spinoal, A. de: *Ao serviço de Portugal*. Lisboa: *Atica-Livraria Bertrand*, 1976. p. 175.

21 Ibid. p. 179.

Using the speech as a program, the radical right-wing organized a protest of the "silent majority" in the capital by September 28th. PPD and CDS joined, and they found active supporters among some members of JSN and the government. The protest was primarily financed by the monopol group Espirito Santo, while the mass media was also mobilized so as to influence public opinion.

The substance of the plan²² was to introduce a military personal dictatorship (on the basis of an extraordinary situation), because of planned riots occurring during the protest, behind the back of the failing compromise between the bourgeoisie and the popular classes, and relying on the "will" of the traditional middle-classes.

The civil (and military) "silent majority" of the society was still in a prepolitical situation, and was neutralized because Spínola's dictatorship would have meant a continuation of the war. So the crisis of September 27-28th was not solved within the scope of the clash of traditional middle-classes and the modern rank of wage-earners (as it was to one year later), but the struggle was fought in their names between the organized, civil right- and left-wing, and reflected in the conflicts of political and military leaders.

The trial failed because of joining together of Costa Gomes, who held a key-position, and COPCON.²³ As a result, conservative and liberal forces were all the more driven back in the third provisional government, also lead by Gonçalves, the JSN was purged, and the Spínola-ists were driven out of the MFA. In the place of Spínola, who was compelled to abdicate, General Francisco da Costa Gomes became the new provisional President of the Republic (simultaneously president of the JSN), which fact meant a return to the original conception of the "captains". In his installation speech²⁴ of September 30th, he supported pluralist democracy as the only means "which can guarantee a field for creating real dimensions of human dignity"; promised to continue decolonization; acknowledged international

22 Branco Livro. *28 de Setembro*. Lisboa: Avante, 1975. p. 62.; Orlando Neves op. cit. p. 61.

23 Saraiva de Carvalho, O.: *Cinco meses mudaram Portugal*. Lisboa: Portugal, 1975. pp. 23-24.

24 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 151-152.

duties, NATO membership among them; and promised to uphold the principle of peaceful coexistence. His role showed the efforts of weak, domestically oriented bourgeoisie to carry out its interests, already under the hegemony of popular forces.

With the turn of the end of September, the conception, which was based on the absolute power of Spínola's conservative presidency failed, and the class-alliance of April disintegrated. The new power no longer represented the interests (concerning first of all - but not only - the colonies) of federative and "neocolonialist" factions of the modern big bourgeoisie (who were united with foreign capital groups).

The outline of the program of renewed power went back to the original conception of CAPTAINS' MOVEMENT, composing it again in the spirit of the slogan of the "three D-s" (*descolonização, democratização, desenvolvimento*) that hall-marked Portuguese revolution.

PORTUGÁLIA 1974: A KOLONIALISTA DIKTATÚRA BUKÁSA

Marcelo Caetanónak a gyarmati háborúk miatt zsákutcába jutott kormánypolitikája ellenében a hadsereg két politikai áramlata kristályosodott ki. Spinola tábornok az uralkodó csoportok képviselőjeként egy konzervatív elnöki rendszer keretében föderációt ígért a háború befejezése fejében. A "kapitányok" mozgalma (MFA) mint a népi osztályok képviselője egy demokratikus rendszer keretében a gyarmati népek önrendelkezését ígérte a békés rendezés érdekében.

A rendszer megdöntésére szövetkezett két áramlat kompromisszumos platformja az alkotmányozó nemzetgyűlési választásig tartó egy éves átmeneti időszakban a demokratikus átalakulást és a gyarmati kérdés politikai rendezését tűzte célul.

Miután az MFA irányította katonai akció 1974. április 25-én megdöntötte Caetano rendszerét, Spinola ideiglenes köztársasági elnök "liberalizált" kolonializmusa szellemében indult meg a feladatmegoldás. Ez a felszabadító mozgalmak katonai ellenállásába ütközött, s a háború folytatásával szembeszegült az MFA befolyásolta gyarmati hadsereg, a baloldali pártok és a tömegmozgalom.

A pathhelyzetet a júliusi politikai válság kimenetele oldotta fel: az induló szövetségben a spinolisták rovására teret nyert az MFA. A hatalomeltolódás következményeként július 26-án Portugália deklarálta a gyarmatok függetlensége értelmében vett dekolonizációt.

A spinolisták ekkor megkísérelték "harmadik erők" kezére játszani a gyarmatokat, feltételeként pedig az MFA-t kiszorítani a hatalomból. A "csendes többség" elnöki diktatúrát célzó szeptember 28-i megmozdulásának elvetélését azonban Spinola bukása követte. Ezzel felbomlott az uralkodó és a népi osztályok áprilisi szövetsége.2: