Constitutional Reform and Reconciliation: Lessons from Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

This paper examines the role of constitutional reform in promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies, focusing on Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These countries, shaped by the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, serve as critical case studies on how constitutional frameworks can either foster peace or perpetuate division. In Kosovo, the 2008 constitution aimed to establish sovereignty while protecting minority rights, particularly for the Serb population. North Macedonia's Ohrid Framework Agreement introduced power-sharing mechanisms that prevented civil war and improved relations between Macedonians and Albanians. Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the Dayton Agreement, illustrates how a complex constitutional arrangement can maintain peace but also entrench ethnic divisions, complicating reconciliation efforts. The paper argues that while constitutional reforms are crucial for conflict resolution, their effectiveness depends on how well they are tailored to the unique needs of divided societies. By analyzing these three cases, the paper identifies key lessons on the potential and limitations of constitutional design in fostering lasting reconciliation.